I have a new job! I’ve been appointed as CEO and Chairman of the Board of Directors of MegaOil Corp … just kidding, but if I were, here’s a short memo I’d be sending to the company’s board of directors.
INTERNAL MEMORANDUM: STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL
TO: Global Investment Committee / Board of Directors
FROM: Office of the Chairman & CEO
DATE: January 5, 2026
SUBJECT: Operational Feasibility & Fiduciary Liability in the “Venezuelan Protectorate”
Following our preliminary review of the Administration’s “Absolute Resolve” press briefing and our own subsequent analysis regarding the “reclamation” of Venezuelan oil assets, I am formalizing our position: We will not authorize a return to the Orinoco Basin under the current U.S.-run governance model.
While the White House frames this as a “business transaction” to reimburse U.S. taxpayers, our legal and environmental risk desks have identified three red-line disqualifiers:
1. The “Hostile Occupant” Liability
International law (specifically the Hague and Geneva Conventions) is clear: an occupying power cannot treat a territory’s natural resources as its own property. The legal trap is that if we enter as a “partner” to a U.S. military administration, we are no longer a private contractor; we are legally classified as an agent of a hostile occupation. This has significant consequences because it exposes us to universal jurisdiction lawsuits in European and Asian courts. We would effectively be unbankable in any jurisdiction that adheres to UN Charter Article 2(4).
2. The China/Russia “Debt-Blockade”
Venezuela owes billions to China and Russia, with oil production as the primary collateral. The U.S. “takeover” does not magically dissolve these sovereign liens. Our operational risk is that China remains Venezuela’s largest customer. If we seize these fields, we are essentially seizing Chinese collateral. We expect immediate counter-seizures of our own tankers and Asian refinery interests in retaliation. It makes no sense to initiate a secondary trade war on our own balance sheet.
3. The Engineering Reality
Populist narratives suggest we can simply “turn the taps back on.” Our own field intelligence suggests the opposite.
First, decades of infrastructure collapse cannot be fixed with a few billion dollars and “American drive.” It will require a 10-year, $100 billion-plus reconstruction effort. Our capital is better used elsewhere, where we can earn higher margins and generate a more significant return on investment.
Second, as the EU launches its Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM) this month, the high-intensity carbon footprint of Orinoco heavy crude makes it a stranded asset before it even reaches the coast. We will not invest in the 20th century’s dirtiest oil while our competitors are pivoting to 21st-century transition fuels. Further oil development should focus on light crudes from sources such as Guyana.
Strategic Summary: We are a corporation, not a colonial administration. Until there is a locally sovereign, internationally recognized government capable of signing binding, non-voidable contracts, Venezuela remains a “no-go” zone for our capital. To do otherwise risks violating our fiduciary duties to our shareholders.